



Turning the Tide in the Pacific, 1941-1943

Student Name _____ Date _____

“Scavenger Hunt” for Use with Interactive Map of the Pacific Theater
http://development.vbcomm.net/15332_NEH/#

Question	Answer
This country allied itself with Japan five days after Japanese forces easily took its capital city.	
By 1941, one quarter of this country was under Japanese control.	
This battle, while considered a draw, caused the Japanese to postpone their invasion of Port Moresby indefinitely.	
This battle is considered the turning point on the Pacific Front because the Japanese navy was severely damaged.	
Control of this island chain was important to the Japanese because it gave them a line of defenses far to the east.	
This city became the site for one of the largest Japanese air and naval bases in the Pacific Theater.	
On December 7, 1941 nearly 400 Japanese aircraft attacked this US Naval base.	
After this raid, all of the B-25 bombers had to crash land in China because the aircraft carriers were not long enough for them to land on.	
The British colony of Malaya was important to the Japanese for what two resources?	
By the time of this battle, the US had broken Japan’s naval code, so the attack was known ahead of time.	
This raid onto Japan did little physical damage but it had a great psychological boost of moral.	

This attack caused President Roosevelt to ask for a declaration of war.	
After this battle, General MacArthur was given command of the entire Pacific forces.	
These mountain passes in this country were critical to the Japanese because they were a major supply route for the United States to China.	
78,000 soldiers surrendered to the Japanese after fierce fighting on this Peninsula.	
British forces were surprised when the Japanese army attacked Singapore by this route.	
Using this island, Japanese forces planned to launch attacks on Australia.	
This raid convinced the Japanese that their primary goal was to destroy American carriers.	
This was the first naval battle in history where the opposing forces never directly saw one another.	
These islands fought desperately to save their country, but after several months, the government fled to Australia.	
This island chain, today known as Indonesia, was critical to Japan because of this resource.	



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Japanese Strategy in the Pacific, 1941-1942

Read the following documents and answer the questions that follow.

Military History Section, Army Forces Far East, “The Japanese Monographs,”

Chapter I: Estimate of the Situation Prior to Outbreak of War:

<http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/152/152chap1.html>

Japanese Navy Minister Shimada:

“In the event of war, the Naval High Command believes that the Navy stands a very good chance of victory in both the early stage operations and the interception operations against the enemy fleet, with the present power ratio. However, should the war continue into its third year and become a long term war, according to comprehensive research by the various Navy departments, shortages of war materials and the inadequacy of Japan's industrial potential will then begin to have their effect on the Navy's strength. Under the latter conditions, it would be difficult for us to have any measure of confidence that we could bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

“On the other hand, if we decide to continue diplomatic negotiations and later fail to bring them to a successful conclusion, we will be forced to open hostilities at a great operational disadvantage, caused by the delay. Consequently, although there is a great risk in beginning the war now we must realize that there is also a great risk in depending upon negotiations unless we can be certain of the final outcome. It would seem, therefore, that whether we continue diplomatic negotiations or open hostilities, great risks and difficulties are involved. The risks involved in each case have to be weighed in order to arrive at an estimate of the general situation. The risks attendant upon the opening of hostilities are enormous and it must be realized that once committed we cannot turn back; therefore, if at all possible, we should use diplomacy. However, if we are not confident of the success of the diplomatic negotiations, then we have no alternative but to take up arms...”

Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano:

“Should Japan's negotiations with the United States fail and war begin between Japan and the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, I believe that, on the basis of the present strength of the operating forces in the Pacific, we have a good chance of defeating the enemy both in the first phase operations and in the interception operations against the enemy fleet, provided hostilities begin in early December. If we are successful in the first phase operations, we should be able to secure strategic key points in the southwest Pacific and thus be in a position to wage a long war of attrition. In a war against the United States and Great Britain, we have no sure way of bringing the enemy to his knees, so in all probability the war would be a protracted one. We must, therefore, be prepared for a long war both spiritually and materially. The outcome of a long war depends on various physical and metaphysical

factors, on our total war potential and on the development of the world situation. It is difficult, under the circumstances, to foretell now whether we have a chance of winning the war several years hence.”

Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama:

“The armies in the southern territories are steadily being reinforced.... Compared with the forces in these territories before the outbreak of war in Europe, the Army in Malaya has increased about eight times, that in the Philippines about four times, that in the Dutch East Indies about two and a half times and that in Burma about five times. The total strength of the armies these territories amounts to a little more than 200,000; we must expect their rate of increase to become greater with time.

“The ground forces in these territories as essentially native armies formed around a nucleus of white troops, which constitute about 30 per cent of the forces. They are not well trained and their combat ability is generally below standard. However, they are inured to tropical weather and climate. We must also remember that their planes perform well and their pilots are quite good.

“From the operational standpoint, each day of delay in the commencement of military operations will place us at a greater disadvantage so that finally it will become impossible to conduct operations for the following reasons:

“1. Japan will not be able to keep pace with the United States in an armament race, especially in aircraft production.

“2. American defenses in the Philippines, as well as other American military preparations, will make rapid headway.

“3. Defensive coordination of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China will be further stepped-up and their combined defensive power in the southern area will be increased vastly.

“4. If the war is delayed until spring, operational action the northern Pacific and Siberia would become possible. Japan then might be committed to fight on the northern and southern fronts at the same time.

“In addition to the above, weather conditions in the anticipated theater of operations, which are a very important factor in the present operations plan, will not allow indefinite postponement of war. Therefore, in order to initiate our military operations immediately upon the completion of present operational preparations, I should like to set the time as early December.

“The major part of the Army's initial operations in the southern areas will consist of landings against strongly defended distant enemy bases. These operations will have to be conducted in scorching heat, while repelling hostile submarines and airplane attacks. We must, therefore, expect to have to surmount considerable difficulties. However, from the over-all standpoint, whereas the enemy forces will be scattered over wide areas separated from each other by sea, rendering it difficult for them to coordinate movements, we will be able to consolidate our forces in surprise attacks to destroy the enemy piecemeal. I am confident, therefore, that close coordination between the Army and the Navy will insure the success of our landing operations. In regard to the operations after the landing, comparing organization, equipment, the quality and the number of men of our forces and the enemy, I am confident that victory will be ours.

“After the conclusion of these operations, even if we did our best to terminate the war as early as possible by diplomatic and military means, especially through the exploitation of our naval successes, we probably would still have to be prepared for a long war. However, since we could capture enemy military and air bases and make our position invulnerable, I believe we could use various means to frustrate the enemy's intentions.

“As to our defense against the Soviet Union and our China operations after we embark on the Southern Operations, we intend to hold generally our present military power which will enable us to strengthen our defenses against the Soviet Union and to continue our operations in China. I think we can exploit our successes in the Southern Operations so that they would help conclude the China Incident.

“The Soviet field armies have suffered severe losses at the hands of the German Army, and the Soviet's munitions industries productive capacity, too, has decreased enormously. The Far Eastern Red Army, furthermore, has sent, since last spring, about 13 divisions of infantry, about 1,300 tanks and no less than 1,300 planes eastward to European Russia, and its fighting strength, I believe, is declining materially and spiritually. Therefore, as long as our Kwantung Army maintains a strong position there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union, on its own initiative, will attack us.”

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analysis Division, “The Campaigns of the Pacific War,” Chapter 1: Japanese Naval Planning: <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Campaigns/USSBS-PTO-1.html>

The Basic Plan for the Greater East Asia War

“The Basic Plan as formulated by the Japanese and placed into effect in December 1941, consisted of the following three phases:

I. The seizure of the Southern Areas which are rich in resources; the attack on the United States Fleet in Hawaii, and the seizure of strategic areas and positions for the establishment of a perimeter for the defense of the Southern Resources Area and the Japanese Mainland. The area to be seized was that within the line which joins the Kuriles, Marshalls (including Wake), Bismarcks, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Burma.

II. Consolidation and strengthening of the defensive perimeter.

III. The interception and destruction of any attacking strength which might threaten the defensive perimeter or the vital areas within the perimeter. Concurrently with intercept operations the activation of plans to destroy the United States will to fight.

“By the successful accomplishment of the three phases of this plan the Japanese hoped to attain the goal of this war, making Japan self-sufficient.

“Upon the successful completion of the first phase, and influenced by the unexpected ease with which their initial operations were carried out, the activation of the second phase was delayed and plans were formulated for further expansion.

“These expansion plans were for the purpose of extending Japanese control of the Pacific and provided for the following:

1. The capture of Port Moresby in order to strengthen the defenses of New Guinea and the Bismarcks.
2. The capture of Midway in order to strengthen the defenses of the Central Pacific and to force a decisive engagement with the United States Fleet.
3. The invasion of the Western Aleutians in order to reinforce the defenses of the Northern Area.

4. The seizure of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa in order to cut lines of communication between the United States and Australia. This latter step was contingent on the successful completion of the others and was scheduled to be activated subsequent to the capture of Midway.”



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Questions on Japanese Strategy in the Pacific, 1941-1942

Question	Answer
<p>What is Japanese Navy Minister Shimada's rationalization for beginning war against the United States sooner rather than later?</p>	
<p>Japanese Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano, said that "it is difficult...to foretell now whether we have a chance of winning the war several years hence." Why would he say such a thing? From the Japanese point of view, what were some important factors that were considered prior to the war?</p>	
<p>What actions did Japan undertake in the late 1930's, early 1940's, to prepare for a war in the Pacific?</p>	
<p>Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama lists various reasons as to why war against the United States must commence immediately. What are they, and which ones are most important in his eyes.</p>	
<p>Does Japan fear an attack from Russia? Why or why not?</p>	
<p>Describe and explain the three phases that Japanese Naval Planners developed for the Pacific Ocean.</p>	



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Allied Strategy in the Pacific, 1941-1942

Read the following documents and answer the questions that follow.

Chiefs of Staff Conference, Washington, DC, December 24, 1941:

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box1/t05d01.html>

10. PACIFIC AREA. -

ADMIRAL STARK [U.S. Chief of Naval Operations] listed the joint aims in the Pacific, as follows:

- Protection of the Burma Road
- Aid to China
- Aid to the Netherlands East Indies
- To hold Singapore
- To hold the Philippine Islands
- Use of Australia as a base

ADMIRAL STARK then reviewed the Naval situation in the Far East as pertains to the Asiatic Fleet. GENERAL MARSHALL [U.S. Army Chief of Staff] reviewed the arrangements which had been made to get planes to the Philippines, not only from Australia, but by convoys; also by flying by way of the eastern route. GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the critical feature of assistance to the Philippines from Australia was the existence of fields in Borneo; and that the present issue is to elaborate our plans for building up bases in Australia.

ADMIRAL POUND [British Chief of Naval Staff] then reviewed what ships the British Navy has around Singapore.

The question was asked MARSHAL DILL [British Field Marshal] as to his opinion of the situation at Singapore, to which he replied that, with reinforcements, the British would be able to hold Singapore....

11. BOMBARDMENT OF JAPAN. -

ADMIRAL STARK asked as to the situation in China for airfields to be used as bases for bombing attacks against Japan.

GENERAL ARNOLD [U.S. Chief of Army Air Forces] stated that General Brett had written for air transport planes for use in reconnaissance work and for supply. He stated that no bombing operations

should be undertaken against Japan unless they are strong enough to create substantial damage; that the minimum number of bombers should be 50; that unsustained attacks would only tend to solidify the Japanese people.

Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, Washington War Conference on American-British Strategy: <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box1/t05s19.html>

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A[merican] –B[ritish] Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.
2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.
3. In our considered opinion therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A[merican]-B[ritish] strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

1. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.
 - a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.
 - b. The maintenance of essential communications.
 - c. Closing and tightening the ring around Germany.
 - d. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.
 - e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.
 - f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests ... and denying to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany....

MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS

10. THE MAIN SEA ROUTES WHICH MUST BE SECURED ARE:

- a. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.

- b. The Pacific routes from the United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia, and the Far East....

11. THE MAIN AIR ROUTES WHICH MUST BE SECURED ARE:

- a. From Cairo [Egypt] to Karachi, Calcutta [India], China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.
- b. From the United States to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.
- c. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.
- d. From the United States to Vladivostok, via Alaska.

12. THE SECURITY OF THESE ROUTES INVOLVES:

- a. Well-balanced A[merican] – B[ritish] naval and air dispositions.
- b. Holding and capturing essential sea and airbases....

THE SAFEGUARDING OF VITAL INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE

The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:

- a. Hawaii and Alaska.
- b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.
- c. Rangoon and the route to China.
- d. The Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

Joint Planning Committee Report to Chiefs of Staff, Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific (The Far East Area and Adjacent Regions):

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box1/t05t01.html>

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific Theatre. The present strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct all all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

The general strategic policy should therefore be:

- a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.
- b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of India.
- c. To reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.
- d. To maintain communications to Burma and Australia and to and within the Far East Area.
- e. To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.



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Questions on Allied Strategy in the Pacific, 1941-1942

Question	Answer
At the Chiefs of Staff Conference in Washington DC, the allied forces laid out their plans for the Pacific Theater. What was the rationale for protecting the Philippines?	
Explain General Arnold's opinion concerning an immediate bombardment of Japan. Why did he recommend waiting?	
Why was Germany considered the primary target?	
The Allied forces put great emphasis on maintaining sea and air routes. What routes were considered most vulnerable and why?	
What was the immediate concern of the allied forces in the east? Explain why early plans were more defensive in nature. How did this relate to the overall goal?	



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U.S. Attitudes toward Japan: A Document-Based Question

Directions: Using the documents that follow, answer the question below. Remember to write your DBQ in proper AP format.

Question: How did the attack on Pearl Harbor affect American attitudes toward the Japanese? How do you think this affected the way the Pacific War was fought?

Document A: Depicting the Enemy. December 1942 Collier's
<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6790>

Document B: “How to tell a Chinese from a ‘Jap’”. <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6795>

Document C: “We need to exterminate them” A Marine Describes the Battle of Guam.
<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5141>

U.S. Marine: I'd like to describe this foxhole to you. It is typical of hundreds on this island. This foxhole is about two feet deep. Now, I would like to be able to speak louder and with more clarity, but unfortunately, the slightest noise, the slightest rustle, will draw fire not only from the Japanese, who are someplace, perhaps, in the dense foliage around us or up on the ridge, but from our own Marines who are huddled nearby in foxholes like this one. I don't know how they [the Japanese] do it. We can lie here absolutely breathless listening to the slightest sounds and not see anything—in fact, not hear anything—and then we wake up and find that they're all around us. And it's a very tough and tedious job to root them out, [inaudible] them and exterminate them. We lost quite a few people in our unit. A very popular captain was killed.

Document D: “Japs keep out”: <http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/experience/index.html>
(enter “japs keep out” as keywords in search engine)

Document E: “Our Next Boss”
<http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/experience/index.html> (enter “our next boss” as keywords in search engine)

Document F: “I’ll Dictate the Terms from the White House”

<http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/experience/index.html> (enter “dictate terms” as keywords in search engine)

Document G: “Milton Eisenhower Justifies the Internment of Japanese Americans”

<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5153>

Milton Eisenhower: When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, our West Coast became a potential combat zone. Living in that zone were more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry: two thirds of them American citizens; one third aliens. We knew that some among them were potentially dangerous. But no one knew what would happen among this concentrated population if Japanese forces should try to invade our shores. Military authorities therefore determined that all of them, citizens and aliens alike, would have to move. This picture tells how the mass migration was accomplished.

Neither the Army nor the War Relocation Authority relished the idea of taking men, women, and children from their homes, their shops, and their farms. So the military and civilian agencies alike determined to do the job as a democracy should: with real consideration for the people involved.

First attention was given to the problems of sabotage and espionage. Now, here at San Francisco, for example, convoys were being made up within sight of possible Axis agents. There were more Japanese in Los Angeles than in any other area. In nearby San Pedro, houses and hotels, occupied almost exclusively by Japanese, were within a stone’s throw of a naval air base, shipyards, oil wells. Japanese fishermen had every opportunity to watch the movement of our ships. Japanese farmers were living close to vital aircraft plants. So, as a first step, all Japanese were required to move from critical areas such as these.

But, of course, this limited evacuation was a solution to only part of the problem. The larger problem, the uncertainty of what would happen among these people in case of a Japanese invasion, still remained. That is why the commanding General of the Western Defense Command determined that all Japanese within the coastal areas should move inland.

Document H: Executive Order 9066: The President Authorizes Japanese Relocation

<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5154>

“...Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General

under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas...”

Document I: Korematsu v. United States: The U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Internment

<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5151>

“...Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we could not reject the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group. In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on the same ground. . . .

We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner violated it. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.

Document J: “Jap Hunting License”:

<http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/experience/index.html> (enter “hunting license” as keywords in search engine)

Document K: “Causes of Incarceration”: <http://www.densho.org/causes/default.asp>

The U.S. was also at war with Italy and Germany during WWII, so why were only people of Japanese ancestry incarcerated as a group?

The decision to incarcerate all individuals of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast in 1942 was influenced by decades of anti-Asian attitudes--ingrained in U.S. institutions, laws and the majority population. During a time when discrimination was accepted by many as part of American culture, special-interest groups formed to stir anti-Japanese feelings and actions. Racial discrimination was legal and established in policies and laws at the city, state and federal level. Media perpetuated negative myths and stereotypes of Japanese people as less than human.