

Activity 1: The United States, Japan, and the “Open Door” in China

Student Name _____ Date _____

Directions: Read the documents below. To help guide your reading, answer the following questions, citing specific evidence from the documents.

Question	Answer
<p>What does Secretary of State Hay mean by an “open door” in China?</p>	
<p>How might “spheres of interest” by other powers in China conflict with the principle of the “open door”?</p>	
<p>Generally speaking, what did Japan want from China in 1915?</p>	
<p>How might the “Twenty-one Demands” come into conflict with the “open door” principle?</p>	

<p>How did the Lansing-Ishii Agreement try to resolve differences between the United States and Japan?</p>	
<p>Could the Lansing-Ishii Agreement be interpreted in more than one way? How might a Japanese diplomat interpret it differently from an American?</p>	
<p>In what sense might the Nine-Power Treaty be considered an improvement over the Lansing-Ishii Agreement?</p>	

The First “Open Door” Note, 6 September 1899:

<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/opendoor.html>

In September 1899 Secretary of State John Hay sent this message to the governments of Germany, Russia, England, Japan, Italy, and France. Although it specifically refers to the recent German acquisition of the Shantung province, the principle of the “open door” in China would serve as the basis for U.S. policy toward East Asia for much of the twentieth century.

At the time when the Government of the United States was informed by that of Germany that it had leased from His Majesty the Emperor of China the port of Kiao-chao and the adjacent territory in the province of Shantung, assurances were given to the ambassador of the United States at Berlin by the Imperial German minister for foreign affairs that the rights and privileges insured by treaties with China to citizens of the United States would not thereby suffer or be in anywise impaired within the area over which Germany had thus obtained control.

More recently, however, the British Government recognized by a formal agreement with Germany the exclusive right of the latter country to enjoy in said leased area and the contiguous "sphere of influence or interest" certain privileges, more especially those relating to railroads and mining enterprises; but as the exact nature and extent of the rights thus recognized have not been clearly defined, it is possible that serious conflicts of interest may at any time arise not only between British and German subjects within said area, but that the interests of our citizens may also be jeopardized thereby.

Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the undoubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various powers claiming "spheres of interest" that they shall enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation within such "spheres," the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German Majesty's Government give formal assurances, and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence—

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest"..., no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances....

“Twenty-One Demands” Made by Japan to China, 18 January 1915:

<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm>

As an ally of Great Britain, Japan declared war on Germany in August 1914, and in the following month Japanese troops captured the Chinese province of Shantung, which had been under German control since 1899. Early in 1915 the Japanese government made the following demands to the Chinese government in Peking.

GROUP I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

Article 1

The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province of Shantung.

Article 2

The Chinese Government engage that, within the province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever....

GROUP II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles....

Article 5

The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance:

(1) whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nationals the supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Article 6

The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.

Article 7

The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chungchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this treaty.

GROUP III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.

Article 2

The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the Said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

GROUP IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following article: The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay on or any island along the coast of China.

GROUP V

Article 1

The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers....

Article 3

In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance the police in localities (in China), where such arrangement: are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police office in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service;

Article 6

In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines, and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien....

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, November 2, 1917:

<http://www.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/japanvisit/JapanA2.htm>

The Twenty-one Demands created a minor crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations, but after the United States entered the war against Germany in April 1917 both sides saw the need to smooth over their differences. Tokyo sent a special envoy, Ishii Kikujiro, to Washington, where in November he signed the following document along with U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing.

The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity [proximity] creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

The Nine-Power Treaty Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922:

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/1922v1/tr22-01.htm>

One of several pacts signed at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the Nine-Power Treaty was an agreement among the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal to guarantee the "open door" in China.

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers...agree:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangements or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking--

- (a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;
- (b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of Participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity....

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory....

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned....

Activity 2: Japan's Grievances

Student Name _____ Date _____

Directions: Read the following documents. When you are done, create a set of cartoons that graphically portray Japan's grievances against the United States and other western powers. Each cartoon should showcase a different grievance. Your cartoon strips should be both factually accurate and visually attractive. Be prepared to present your cartoon to the class.

Excerpts from K.K. Kawakami, "The Problem of Japan: A Japanese View," November 1921:
<http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1501>

The following comes from an article which appeared in the American journal The Nation in November 1921. Kiyoshi "Karl" Kawakami (1873-1949) was a Japanese journalist who covered American affairs for several important Japanese newspapers. He was also a frequent contributor to U.S. magazines and newspapers.

Roughly speaking, the land area of the earth measures 52,825,000 square miles; supporting 1,751,700,000 inhabitants. Of this total area the Caucasian peoples occupy or control about 46,146,084 square miles. It will be seen that the Caucasian race, having completed the occupation of Europe and the Americas, has conquered and secured control of the whole of Australasia, almost all Africa, the greater part of Asia, as well as the adjacent islands. And the Caucasian peoples who control so vast a territory number only 623,000,000....

On the other hand, the native population of Asia numbers no less than 900,000,000. And yet they control only 6,679,000 square miles of territory, because Siberia and Turkestan are occupied by Russia, India by Great Britain, and Tongking and Cochin-China by France, while Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, Mongolia, and Northern Manchuria, aggregating 2,655,000 square miles, are fast passing under British or Russian control. In other words, there are 134.8 Asiatics to each square mile of Asiatic land.

It may, therefore, be safely said that Asia's 900,000,000 souls have been expropriated of most of their territory and are today permitted to possess only 6,679,000 square miles. This, of course, does not mean that Asiatics have been evicted from the Asiatic territories controlled by Europeans, and that 900,000,000 people are actually compelled to live within the area of 6,679,000 square miles, i.e., 134.8 to the square mile. It is true that the natives of Asia are permitted to continue their habitation in India, Cochin-China, Siberia, and other Asiatic territories which have passed under the European scepter: But the fact remains that Asiatic nations are, by this process of expropriation, deprived of the opportunity to utilize the vast resources lying at their very doors.

It must be remembered that the Caucasian nations are always on the alert to exclude outside enterprises, and especially those of non-Caucasian peoples, from the territories they control. Even where they profess to follow the principles of free trade, they set up a barrier against non-Caucasian immigration. Moreover, by reason of their priority and their accumulated wealth, they have so firmly entrenched

themselves that outsiders, most of all non-Caucasian outsiders, find little chance to launch new enterprises in competition with them.

Now let us consider the particular case of Japan. Even schoolchildren know that Japan consists of volcanic ranges. The country is virtually filled with mountains, affording but 15,000,000 acres of tillable land, or only 16 per cent of the total area. This allows each inhabitant only one-quarter of an acre of farm land. In California farm land per capita of population is about nine acres. In Great Britain 77 per cent of its land area is agricultural land; in Italy 76 per cent; in France 70 per cent, and in Germany 65 per cent. Because of the peculiar topography of Japan the country appears, and as a matter of fact is, much more crowded than may be judged from statistics on paper. No traveler, not even the most unobserving, can fail to get this impression....

But it is not only the question of land shortage and overpopulation that weigh heavily upon Japan. Equally depressing is the fact that she has not within her own confines adequate mineral resources essential to modern industry. She depends almost entirely upon foreign countries for iron ores. Of coal she has little that can be used in the steel industry. But the most serious handicap is the lack of petroleum, a material which is becoming more and more important in transportation and in manufacturing industries. If you watch the chessboard of European and American diplomacy, you cannot fail to see how each nation is trying to outwit the other in gaining control of oil resources in different parts of the world.

And here is Japan, struggling to solve, partly at least, her population problem by becoming an industrial and trading nation, and yet harassed by the lack of three essential materials of industry—oil, iron, and coal. If she steps an inch out of her narrow precincts and tries to obtain, say in Siberia or China, the privilege of working such mineral resources, down comes the sword of Damocles in the shape of protest, official or otherwise, from the Western nations.

It is obvious that to great Powers of the West have accumulated more land than they should rightly own—than they can hold without doing injustice to the smaller nations, which find themselves in sad plight, due to the impossibility of finding room for their surplus population. The injustice of holding such vast territories would not be so obvious if they were to recognize, in favor of the small nations, the principle of unhindered immigration and of unrestricted enterprise within those territories. It is when they adopt a hide-bound policy of exclusion that they become a menace to the welfare of the human race.

A program to establish permanent peace with justice should contain one of two propositions, namely, a more equitable distribution of territory or the removal of the exclusive policy adopted by Western colonial Powers against Asiatic peoples. To the staid thinkers of the Occident this must seem a picturesque and Quixotic [hopeless] proposition. It is no more picturesque than were trade unionism or woman suffrage at their inception. Just as the political and economic theories which were denounced as visionary and perverted less than a century ago have since gradually been woven into the practical policies of various nations, so the above proposition will in time be seriously considered, not only by thinkers and theorists, but by practical men of affairs in all parts of the world. Unless we make supreme efforts to realize this ideal there remains but one alternative—the perpetuation of the savage "law of the survival of the fittest," which is equivalent to the Bismarckian axiom "Might is right."

“The Senate’s Declaration of War”: Japan Responds to Japanese Exclusion:
<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5077>

In 1924 the U.S. Congress passed legislation severely limiting immigration from Europe, and cutting off almost all immigration from Asia. Two years earlier the Supreme Court had ruled that Asians were ineligible for U.S. citizenship. The Japanese viewed such measures as deliberate insults, and responded by organizing boycotts of American products. The following editorial appeared in the April 29, 1924 issue of the Japan Times and Mail.

There is no denying that the adoption by the American Senate of the exclusion amendment to the Immigration Bill has given a shock to the whole Japanese race such as has never before been felt and which will undoubtedly be remembered for a long time to come. The wonder is, rather, that the shock has not found expression in a louder outburst of indignation than is the case. The knowledge that Senators Johnson, Shortridge and company do not necessarily represent the entire American nation in offering an unnecessary affront, is largely responsible for the spirit of forbearance which seems to be generally ruling the mind of the nation for the present. The country is aware, also, that the Immigration Bill as a whole has yet to be passed by the Senate, to be put through a joint conference of the two Houses and then to receive the signature of President Coolidge before it becomes law, and it is unquestionably thought unwise to destroy, by ill-measured utterances, the only possible chances that might prove favorable to the Japanese in the meantime.

Nevertheless the fact remains that the Senate has passed, with an overwhelming majority, an amendment which they know is a most humiliating one to the Japanese race, and the event cuts the Japanese minds deep, a wound that will hurt and rankle for generations and generations....

...[T]he Senate has been most unfortunate in the choice of time for taking its action. While professing to be jubilant over the increased prospects of permanency of peace in consequence of the Washington Conference, all Japanese have ever since felt in the secret recesses of their heart that their country has been considerably weakened in its naval strength. To add to this there came that great devastating earthquake of last year [1923, when a massive earthquake destroyed a large section of Tokyo], with its far reaching effect in all directions, seen especially in the ever-increasing balance of the country's trade on the wrong side. It has been said openly more than once in different quarters abroad that Japan is as good as crushed to a naval and economic helplessness, from which there will be no recovering for a generation or two. Mark, then, it is at such a time that the Senate of the United States has said practically this: "We deliberately offer you this insult, knowing that you can do no more than make a wry face." [...]

This is extremely unfortunate. For a friendly turn in the hour of need will be remembered permanently, but an unfriendly act that takes advantage of one's helpless condition makes nothing of all the past and darkens the long future....

Activity 3: The United States and the Manchurian Crisis

Student Name _____ Date _____

Directions: Consult the interactive timeline “America on the Sidelines: The United States and World Affairs, 1931-1941” [<http://teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/neutrality/>] and read the September 1931 event “Japan invades Manchuria.” Consider the various options available to the United States—listed in the upper-right-hand corner—and select what you think the actual response was. If you choose the wrong response, continue to make selections until you find the right one. After you have finished, read the following documents about Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s policy of “nonrecognition.”

After you have finished, your teacher will ask you to imagine that the year is 1932, and that you are an adviser to the Secretary of State. The Secretary has asked for your candid assessment of his “nonrecognition” policy. Based on the documents below, as well as what you have learned from the previous two activities, do you believe that this is an adequate response to Japan’s aggression in Manchuria? Are there alternative policies available that might be more effective? Be sure to cite specific evidence from the documents in your answers.

Memorandum Handed by Secretary of State Henry Stimson to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, September 22, 1931: <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/002.html>

Without going into the background, either as to the immediate provocation or remote causes or motivation, it appears that there has developed within the past four days a situation in Manchuria which I find surprising and view with concern. Japanese military forces, with some opposition at some points by Chinese military forces, have occupied the principal strategic points in South Manchuria, including the principal administrative center, together with some at least of the public utilities. It appears that the highest Chinese authority ordered the Chinese military not to resist, and that, when news of the situation reached Tokyo, but after most of the acts of occupation had been consummated, the Japanese Government ordered cessation of military activities on the part of the Japanese forces. Nevertheless, it appears some military movements have been continuously and are even now in process. The actual situation is that an arm of the Japanese Government is in complete control of South Manchuria....

This situation is of concern, morally, legally and politically to a considerable number of nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The American Government is confident that it has not been the intention of the Japanese Government to create or to be a party to the creation of a situation which brings the applicability of treaty provisions into consideration. The American Government does not wish to be hasty in formulating its conclusions or in taking a position. However, the American Government feels that a very unfortunate situation exists, which no doubt is embarrassing to the Japanese Government. It would seem that the

responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising *de facto* control in South Manchuria....

It is the hope of the American Government that the orders which it understands have been given both by the Japanese and the Chinese Governments to their military forces to refrain from hostilities and further movements will be respected and that there will be no further application of force. It is also the hope of the American Government that the Japanese and the Chinese Governments will find it possible speedily to demonstrate to the world that neither has any intention to take advantage, in furtherance of its own peculiar interests, of the situation which has been brought about in connection with and in consequence of this use of force.

What has occurred has already shaken the confidence of the public with regard to the stability of conditions in Manchuria, and it is believed that the crystallizing of a situation suggesting the necessity for an indefinite continuance of military occupation would further undermine that confidence.

Secretary of State Henry Stimson to the Japanese Foreign Minister, January 7, 1932:

<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/005.html>

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

The Ambassador to Japan (Joseph Grew) to Secretary of State Henry Stimson, August 13, 1932:

<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/010.html>

This situation [in Japan today] reminds me strongly of the efforts of the German Government, by calumniating [denouncing through lies] foreign nations, to build up a public war psychology in 1914, the effort being repeated whenever some new venture, such as the indiscriminate submarine warfare, was about to be launched. Here in Japan the deliberate building up of public animosity against foreign nations in general and the United States in particular has doubtless a similar purpose—to strengthen the hand of the military in its Manchurian venture in the face of foreign, and especially American, opposition. I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness, not of strength. The internal economic and financial situation in Japan is serious and may become desperate. The plight of the farmers is very bad, many industries are at low ebb, unemployment is steadily increasing. The yen is

falling and prices have not yet risen proportionately. Money cannot be obtained from abroad; I was recently told, although I cannot vouch for the reliability of the information, that the Government had tried without success to obtain loans from England, France and Holland in turn. It will become increasingly difficult to obtain domestic loans. This situation is not critical, but it may become so when the ability of the National Bank of Japan to absorb domestic bonds comes to an end. Meanwhile millions of yen are being squandered to support the Manchurian venture, of which the eventual economic advantage is highly problematical, and when the full purport of these expenses becomes known to the people, in their own serious deprivation, there is no telling what effect it will create. I believe that a steadily increasing anxiety exists among the Government and the thinking men of the country outside of the hot-headed military clique which refuses to face these facts. It seems to be primarily this military element...who believe that the best way to obscure these facts is to work the public into a patriotic and nationalistic fervor by representing foreign nations, particularly the United States, as trying to thwart Japan's efforts for alleged self-preservation.

Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military machine, supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology, took the bit in its teeth and overrode all restraining influences in 1914. The Japanese military machine is not dissimilar. It has been built for war, feels prepared for war and would welcome war. It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited self confidence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render it criminal to close them.