Activity #1: Plans for Postwar Europe

Directions (Group #1): The Yalta Conference produced a set of agreements on the nature of the postwar world. As you read through the following document, complete the worksheet below, indicating what specifically was agreed upon at Yalta. To identify the locations mentioned in the document, see the interactive map, located at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/coldwareuropemap/.

Excerpts from the Yalta Conference: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm

[For background on this conference, click on location #2 on the interactive map.]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

[Note: While this agreement covered nearly every country in Europe, it would only break down over the fate of Central and Eastern Europe.]

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany [Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece] and the peoples of the former Axis [the alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan] satellite states of Europe [that is, eastern European countries allied to Germany; namely Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria] to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration....

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of [British Foreign Secretary] Mr. Anthony Eden, [U.S. ambassador to Great Britain] Mr. John Winant, and [Soviet ambassador to Great Britain] Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

...V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

   (a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.
   (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
   (c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

...VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

[Note: For background on the Polish situation, click on location #1 on the interactive map.]

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland [that is, the Communist government recognized by the Soviet Union on January 5] should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad [namely London]. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"[Soviet foreign minister] M. [Vyacheslav] Molotov, [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] Mr. [Averell] Harriman and [British ambassador to the Soviet Union] Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier [border] of Poland should follow the Curzon Line [a line first drawn by a Soviet diplomat in 1919, but which was fairly similar to the line which German and Soviet diplomats established in 1939 as the border between German-controlled Poland and Soviet-controlled Poland. In other words, the Soviets would not have to give up what they had taken from Poland in 1939.].... They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west [in other words, territory taken from Germany]...."
Activity #1: Plans for Postwar Europe

For each of the subjects listed in the left-hand column, indicate what agreement was reached at Yalta.

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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
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<td>The future of the liberated states (as well as Axis satellite states)</td>
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Activity #1: Plans for Postwar Europe

Directions (Group #2): The Potsdam Conference produced a set of agreements on the nature of the postwar world. As you read through the following document, complete the worksheet below, indicating what specifically was agreed upon at Potsdam. To identify the locations mentioned in the document, see the interactive map, located at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/coldware Europemap/.

Excerpts from the (Berlin) Potsdam Conference:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm

[For background on this conference, click on location #4 on the interactive map.]

II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

   (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

   (a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD, and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations [in other words, all groups with any connection to the German military], together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;
(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist [Nazi] Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

…9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

...III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria....

[....]

VIII. POLAND

A. DECLARATION

[Note: For background on the Polish situation, click on the box labeled “1” on the interactive map.]

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the
Crimea [Yalta] Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists....

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

**B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND**

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea [Yalta] Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views....

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde [a city on the Baltic Sea], and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier...including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. [The border described here is the border between East Germany and Poland shown on the interactive map; it remains the border between Germany and Poland to this day.]

[...]

Permission is granted to educators to reproduce this worksheet for classroom use
**Activity #1: Plans for Postwar Europe**

For each of the subjects listed in the left-hand column, indicate what agreement was reached at Potsdam.

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Activity #2: The Breakdown of Cooperation

Directions (Group #1): At the first two meetings of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union it became obvious that putting into practice the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam was going to be more difficult than it had first appeared. As you read through the following documents, complete the worksheet below, indicating the differences that emerged between the West and the Soviet Union. To identify the locations mentioned in the document, see the interactive map, located at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/coldwareeuropemap/.

FIRST MEETING OF COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 11 TO OCTOBER 2, 1945: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade18.htm

[For more information on this meeting, click on location #5 on the interactive map.]

The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers closed in a stalemate. But that need not, and should not, deprive us of a second and better chance to get on with the peace...

The first session of the Council, so far as the personal participation of the Foreign Ministers was concerned, was intended to provide directives for the deputies in the preparation of treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

This work was exploratory—to find out on what points we were in agreement, on what points we differed, and on what points further study and data were required. It is a little naive to suppose that when really vital differences emerge, one nation or another is likely to abandon its position on the first interchange of views.

At this stage it is as important to know and understand wherein we and our Allies differ as wherein we agree. We must understand our points of difference before we can intelligently consider means of reconciling them....

I should say a few words about the Soviet Delegation's disappointment with the failure of Great Britain and the United States to recognize the Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments.

The thought apparently exists in their mind that our government objects to these governments because they are friendly to the Soviet Union and that our unwillingness to recognize these governments is a manifestation of unfriendliness to the Soviet Union.

There could be no greater misconception of our attitude. I was at Yalta. The Yalta declaration on the liberated and ex-satellite countries was based on a proposal submitted by President Roosevelt. Under it
the Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union, assumed the responsibility of concerting their policies to assist in the establishment of interim governments broadly representative of all important democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people. That pledge cannot be fulfilled in countries where freedom of speech and of assembly are denied.

That policy sponsored by President Roosevelt was America's policy and remains America's policy.

We are well aware that no government is perfect and that the representative character of any provisional government will always be subject to debate. We do not demand perfection where perfection is unobtainable.

In an effort to concert our policies with our Allies we have tried to show a spirit of conciliation. Certainly we did not make unduly exacting the requirements we set before we recognized the Provisional Polish Government or the conditions which we have proposed as a basis for the recognition of the Provisional Hungarian Government.

And I hope that as the result of efforts now being made by the Provisional Austrian Government to broaden its representation, we may soon be able to recognize that Government.

At Berlin we stated we would examine in the near future, in the light of prevailing conditions, the question of recognition of Rumania and Bulgaria. We have investigated and we shall continue to investigate. But we cannot know whether conditions justify recognition unless our political representatives are fully informed and unless our news correspondents are permitted freely to enter countries and freely to send their stories uncensored.

We do not seek to dictate the internal affairs of any people. We only reserve for ourselves the right to refuse to recognize governments if after investigation we conclude they have not given to the people the rights pledged to them in the Yalta agreement....

The peace of Europe depends upon the existence of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and its European neighbors, and two wars in one generation have convinced the American people that they have a very vital interest in the maintenance of peace in Europe.

The American Government shares the desire of the Soviet Union to have governments friendly to the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe.

But lasting peace depends not only upon friendship between governments but upon friendship between peoples....

Undeterred by temporary set-backs and ever willing to accord to others that tolerant understanding that we wish others to accord to us, we must not relax in our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace for ourselves and all nations. "With firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in."
The question of the recognition of the ex-satellite states was discussed. Since the London conference, we have found it possible to recognize Austria and Hungary where free elections have occurred. There is still a wide divergence in our viewpoints on the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. That divergence is accentuated by the fact that in those countries democratic institutions have not functioned in accordance with traditions familiar to us.

The Soviet Union contends that the governments of those countries are satisfactory and conditions do not warrant concerted action under the Yalta Agreement. And concerted action is possible only by common agreement.

Our objections to the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments have been not only to the exclusion of important democratic groups from those governments, but to the oppressive way in which those governments exercise their powers. Until now our objections have been little heeded by those governments or by the Soviet Government.

It must be recognized that the Soviet Government has a very real interest in the character of the governments of these states. These countries are neighbors of the Soviet Union and were involved in the war against the Soviet Union. It is therefore to be expected that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these countries may depend upon the Soviet Government's confidence in the peaceful character of these governments.

I urged upon Generalissimo Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov that it was in their interest as well as ours, that the peoples of these countries, as well as their governments, should be peacefully disposed toward the Soviet Union. I stressed the fact that it was our desire to work with the Soviet Government and not against it in making these governments more representative. And for the first time since Yalta the Soviet Government has agreed to cooperate with us to this end.

A tripartite commission is to proceed immediately to Rumania to advise the King, who has sought the advice of the three Allied governments, on broadening representation in the Rumanian Government. At London we asked this but were unable to secure agreement.

The British and American Governments have agreed that they will recognize the Rumanian Government as soon as they are satisfied that the Government has been broadened to include two truly representative members of two important political parties not now represented in the Government and assurances have been given regarding free elections, freedom of speech, press, religion, and association. These are the terms under which we will recognize this government. It is for us to say whether the terms have been complied with.

The situation in Bulgaria is complicated by the fact that an election has already occurred there which the Soviet Government regards as a free election and we do not. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government has undertaken to advise the new Bulgarian Government to include in the government two members truly
representative of important political parties not now included. The British Government and the
American Government have stated that as soon as they are satisfied that this has been done they will
recognize the new Bulgarian Government.

The agreements regarding Rumania and Bulgaria do not go as far as I should have liked, but I am
hopeful that they will result in a substantial improvement in the democratic character of these
governments…

…In international affairs, as in national affairs, conflicting interests can be reconciled only by frank
discussion and better understanding. The meeting in Moscow did serve to bring about better
understanding. We must not slacken in our efforts. With patience, good will, and tolerance we must
strive to build and maintain a just and enduring peace.

Indicate below which of the agreements mentioned at Yalta and Potsdam are addressed in these
documents, and the difficulties that have arisen in carrying out those agreements.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
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Activity #2: The Breakdown of Cooperation

Directions (Group #2): During the second meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union it became obvious that putting into practice the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam was going to be more difficult than it had first appeared. As you read through the following document, complete the worksheet below, indicating the differences that emerged between the West and the Soviet Union. To identify the locations mentioned in the document, see the interactive map, located at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/coldwareeuropemap/.

SECOND MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, PARIS:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade20.htm

Report by Secretary Byrnes, May 20, 1946

The progress made towards peace at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was disappointingly small in light of the expectations we had when it was agreed at Moscow last December that the Council should resume the work which had been interrupted by our inability to agree at London last September....

Security is the concern of every nation. But the effort of one nation to increase its security may threaten the security of other nations and cause them in turn to try to increase their own security. The quest for security may lead to less rather than more security in the world.

It is in truth extremely difficult to know to what extent the action of any nation may be ascribed to its quest for security or to its desire to expand. But some so-called security moves on the diplomatic checkerboard have not contributed to a general sense of security.

Many of these moves are said to originate in the fear of the revival of German military might....

At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers when the Soviet Foreign Secretary seemed greatly concerned about the Soviet security requirements in the Balkans, I suggested a twenty-five year four-power treaty, to keep Germany disarmed as a means of preventing any real threat to Soviet security. I explained that we contemplated a similar joint guaranty of the disarmament of Japan....

In February I sent a working draft of the proposed treaty for German disarmament to the Soviet, British and the French Governments and the proposed treaty for Japanese disarmament to the Soviet, British and Chinese Governments. I invited their suggestions as to the draft....
The Soviet Minister agreed to discuss it informally but stated without specification that there were serious objections to the draft....

It is our sincere hope that after the Soviet Union studies our proposal and comes to appreciate our earnest desire to see Germany disarmed and kept disarmed, the Soviet Union will support it wholeheartedly.

While the making of the German peace settlement may take some time, we took the initiative at Paris to propose the immediate appointment of special deputies to prepare a peace settlement which could be considered at a general Allied conference, the date of which should be fixed by the Council at its next session.

While there is no German government yet which could accept the settlement, agreement among the Allies on the nature of the settlement is necessary to enable the Allies to know the goal towards which the Allied occupation and administration should be directed and the kind of German government which should be created to accept the settlement.

I also asked that the Special Deputies on Germany be instructed to report on several pressing problems, including boundary and economic questions. We cannot, for example, continue to carry out the reparation program if Germany is not to be administered as an economic unit [that is, as a single entity that included all of the zones of occupation] as agreed upon at Potsdam. Whatever boundaries are agreed upon for Germany, she must be able to subsist without external assistance. We cannot subsidize Germany to enable her to pay reparations to other nations.

I regret that the Soviet Representative was not prepared to act upon my proposal for the appointment of Special Deputies without further study. I shall renew my proposal when the Council reconvenes. Important as the German questions are and eager as we are to press for their speedy solution, we must not and cannot delay the peace settlements with other countries. At Potsdam it was agreed that the start should be made with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. While Germany must remain under occupation for some time, we cannot fail to do our part to rid the rest of Europe of the burden of the forces of occupation. There can be no recovery in Europe until we do....

It is American policy to press unremittingly for the conclusion of peace settlements to make possible the withdrawal of troops from countries where they do not belong and where they impose justified economic and social difficulties upon the people. And even without waiting for the conclusion of peace treaties it is American policy to press for the reduction of occupation troops in all countries....

Our problems are serious, but I am not discouraged. Our offensive to secure peace has only begun. We are determined to work for political and economic peace in Europe, in the Near East and in the rest of the world. We shall work for it in the peace conferences and in the councils of the United Nations. The objective of our offensive is not territory or reparations for the United States. The objective is peace—not a peace founded upon vengeance or greed, but a just peace, the only peace that can endure.

Report by Secretary Byrnes, July 15, 1946

…While the Council made real progress toward peace with Italy and the ex-satellite states it made no progress at all on the German and Austrian questions. Perhaps the time taken in discussion was not wholly lost, because our experience suggests that understandings, particularly with our Soviet friends,
cannot be reached until we have gone through rounds of verbal combat, in which old complaints are repeated, past positions reaffirmed, differences accentuated, and crises provoked.

I am ready to believe it is difficult for them to understand us, just as it is difficult for us to understand them. But I sometimes think our Soviet friends fear we would think them weak and soft if they agreed without a struggle on anything we wanted, even though they wanted it too. Constant struggle, however, is not always helpful in a world longing for peace.

The Soviets started the German discussion with a prepared statement on the draft treaty we had proposed to guarantee the continued demilitarization and disarmament of Germany for at least a quarter of a century. The Soviet statement reveals how hard-pressed the Soviets were to find real objection to a treaty which gives them the assurance that Germany should never again become a threat to their security or to the security of Europe....

The Soviets stated that our proposed treaty was inadequate; that it did not assure the de-Nazification [that is, the elimination of Nazism] and democratization of Germany; that it did not assure them reparations. But these are political matters which are already dealt with in the Potsdam Agreement.

Our military agreement of June 5, 1945 provided for the prompt disarmament of armed forces and demilitarization of war plants. By our 25-year treaty we propose that when Germany is once disarmed we shall see that she stays disarmed. We cannot understand Soviet opposition, especially as Generalissimo Stalin on last December 24th agreed with me in principle on this subject.

The Soviet representative stated he had reports that in the British zone the disarming of military forces was not being carried out. The British representative stated he had reports that in the Soviet zone German war plants were being operated.

We asked that the Control Commission investigate the accuracy of both reports. The British and the French agreed. But the Soviet Government would not agree to the investigation unless we limited it to the disarmament of armed forces.

I certainly made clear in our earlier meeting in Paris that the proposed guaranty of German demilitarization was only a part of the German settlement. I proposed then and I proposed again at our recent meeting that deputies be appointed to start work on the whole settlement which the Allies expect the Germans to accept. The British and French accepted the proposal. The Soviets rejected it....

It is no secret that the four-power control of Germany on a zonal basis is not working well from the point of view of any of the four powers. Under the Potsdam Agreement Germany was to be administered as an economic unit and central administrative departments were to be established for this purpose. But in fact Germany is being administered in four closed compartments with the movement of people, trade, and ideas between the zones more narrowly restricted than between most independent countries. In consequence none of the zones is self-supporting. Our zone costs our taxpayers $200,000,000 a year. And despite the heavy financial burden being borne by ourselves and other occupying powers, the country is threatened with inflation and economic paralysis.

This condition must not continue. At Paris we proposed that the Control Commission be instructed to establish the central administrative agencies necessary to administer Germany as an economic unit, and to arrange for the exchange of products between the zones and for a balanced program of imports and exports....
I made clear that we were unwilling to share responsibility for the economic paralysis and suffering we felt certain would follow [if] present conditions in Germany [were to continue].

I then announced that as a last resort we were prepared to administer our zone in conjunction with any one or more of the other zones as an economic unit. I indicated that recently we had secured cooperation with the Soviet zone in one matter and with the British in another. I explained that our offer was made not in an effort to divide Germany but to bring it together.

I stated that whatever arrangements were made with one government would be open on equal terms to the governments of the other zones at any time they were prepared to participate....

Our military representative in Germany will this week be instructed to cooperate with any one or all of the three governments [the other three occupying Germany—that is, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union] in essential administrative matters like finance, transportation, communication, trade, and industry. We will either secure economic cooperation between the zones or place the responsibility for the violation of the Potsdam Agreement [on the Soviets]....

We do not believe in a peace based on a desire for vengeance. We believe in justice, charity, and mercy. If we act with charity and mercy, those we fear as enemies may become our friends. We must trust to the healing processes of peace and pray that God in His mercy will give peace to the world.

Indicate below which of the agreements mentioned at Yalta and Potsdam are addressed in this document, and the difficulties that have arisen in carrying out those agreements.

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Activity #3: Why did Cooperation Break Down?

Directions (Group #1): As you read the following document, answer the questions on the worksheet. After you are finished you may be called upon to advise President Truman on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

Excerpts from Telegram from George Kennan to Secretary of State George Marshall, February 22, 1946 (the “Long Telegram”):

[A native of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, George F. Kennan (1904-2005) graduated from Princeton University in 1925 and soon thereafter went to work for the U.S. State Department as an expert on Russia. He spent much of the 1930s attached to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, where he witnessed firsthand the internal workings of the Soviet Union, including the show trials in which Stalin condemned thousands of suspected political opponents to death. This experience convinced Kennan that there was little hope for lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West. In May 1944 he was appointed deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Moscow. Having spent years studying the history of Russia and the Soviet Union, he sent this telegram to Washington, offering his views on why the Soviets were behaving as they were.]

At the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is [the] traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was [the] insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on [a] vast exposed plain in [the] neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with [an] economically advanced West, fear of [the] more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than [the] Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, ...unable to stand comparison for contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between [the] Western world and their own, feared what would happen if [the] Russians learned [the] truth about [the] world without [that is, the world outside Russia] or if foreigners learned the truth about the world within [Russia]. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction [of] rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it....

We have now seen nature and background of the Soviet program. What may we expect of its practical implementations? [...]

A. Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state; intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders;
continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in [the] dark.

B. Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance [the] official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm [a Danish island in the Baltic Sea]. However, other points may at any time come into question, if...Soviet political power is extended to new areas....

It may be expected that the component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized, in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

1. To undermine [the] general political and strategic potential of major Western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc. [...] 

3. Where individual governments stand in [the] path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor government [that is, government run by the Labor Party] in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate....

4. In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward [the] destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political, or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power [that is, the power of the Soviet state]. Thus persons who are financially independent - such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans, and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema....

5. Everything possible will be done to set major Western powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals [Europeans], including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers [that is, the United States and Great Britain]. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among others from which Russia might be excluded....

6. In general, all Soviet efforts on [the] unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond [the] reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with [the] basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in [the] administration and especially in [the] police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence [that is, the ultimate police state]...accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives....
This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. The problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably the greatest it will ever have to face. It should be the point of departure from which our political general staff work at the present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with the same thoroughness and care as the solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in the planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all the answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that the problem is within our power to solve...without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(One) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite [Nazi] Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. It is impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw — and usually does — when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(Two) Gauged against Western world as a whole, the Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on the degree of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which the Western world can muster. And this is one factor which it is within our power to influence.

(Three) Success of Soviet system, as a form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive the supreme test of the successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Vladimir Lenin’s [first leader of the Soviet Union] death [in 1924] was the first such transfer, and its effects wracked the Soviet state for fifteen years after. Stalin’s death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be the final test. The Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to a series of additional strains.... In Russia, the Communist party has now become a great and — for the moment — highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured. [In other words, the Soviet Union might collapse from within.]

(Four) All Soviet propaganda beyond the Soviet security sphere [that is, the Soviet Union and its satellite states] is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart the problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, the following comments:

1. Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with the same courage, detachment, objectivity, and the same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which a doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individuals.

2. We must see that our public is educated to the realities of Russian situation. I cannot overemphasize the importance of this. The press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on the practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by the ugliness of the picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if the realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown....
3. Much depends on [the] health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like [a] malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is the point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve [the] internal problems of our own society, to improve [the] self-confidence, discipline, morale, and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués....

4. We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past. It is not enough to urge the people to develop political processes similar to our own [that is, democracy]. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by [the] experiences of the past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than the Russians to give them this. And unless we do, the Russians certainly will.

5. Finally, we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
Activity #3: Why did Cooperation Break Down?

Directions (Group #2): As you read the following document, answer the questions on the worksheet. After you are finished you may be called upon to advise President Truman on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

“Achieving an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Confidence”: Henry A. Wallace offers an Alternative to Cold War Containment:  http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6906

[Henry A. Wallace (1888-1965) grew up on a farm in Iowa, and graduated from Iowa State College in 1910. In 1915 he founded a business that remains to this day one of the most profitable agricultural corporations in the United States. In 1933 Franklin D. Roosevelt named him Secretary of Agriculture, a position which Wallace held until FDR selected him as his running mate for the 1940 presidential election. As vice president he became increasingly outspoken in his liberal views, leading FDR to drop him from the ticket in 1944 in favor of Harry Truman. However, he remained in the cabinet as Secretary of Commerce, and he remained in this post after Truman became president in May 1945. In July 1946 he sent this letter to President Truman, expressing his concern about the growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.]

I have been increasingly disturbed about the trend of international affairs since the end of the war, and I am even more troubled by the apparently growing feeling among the American people that another war is coming and the only way that we can head it off is to arm ourselves to the teeth. Yet all of past history indicates that an armaments race does not lead to peace but to war. The months just ahead may well be the crucial period which will decide whether the civilized world will go down in destruction after the five or ten years needed for several nations to arm themselves with atomic bombs. Therefore, I want to give you my views on how the present trend toward conflict might be averted....

How do American actions since V-J Day [Victory over Japan Day, that is, the end of World War II] appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like $13 billion for the War and Navy Departments, the Bikini [an island in the Pacific] tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29s [a type of heavy bomber] and planned production of B-36s [another type of bomber], and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table.

These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of
mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coastlines, and we did not?

Some of the military men and self-styled “realists” are saying: “What’s wrong with trying to build up a predominance of force? The only way to preserve peace is for this country to be so well armed that no one will dare attack us. We know that America will never start a war.”

The flaw in this policy is simply that it will not work. In a world of atomic bombs and other revolutionary new weapons, such as radioactive poison gases and biological warfare, a peace maintained by a predominance of force is no longer possible.

Why is this so? The reasons are clear:

FIRST. Atomic warfare is cheap and easy compared with old-fashioned war. Within a very few years several countries can have atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. Compared with the cost of large armies and the manufacture of old-fashioned weapons, atomic bombs cost very little and require only a relatively small part of a nation’s production plant and labor force.

SECOND. So far as winning a war is concerned, having more bombs—even many more bombs—than the other fellow is no longer a decisive advantage. If another nation had enough bombs to eliminate all of our principal cities and our heavy industry, it wouldn’t help us very much if we had ten times as many bombs as we needed to do the same to them.

THIRD. And most important, the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in a neurotic, fear-ridden, itching-trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world, and because of our wealth and vulnerability we would be among the most seriously affected. Atomic war will not require vast and time-consuming preparations, the mobilization of large armies, the conversion of a large proportion of a country’s industrial plants to the manufacture of weapons. In a world armed with atomic weapons, some incident will lead to the use of those weapons....

In general there are two overall points of view which can be taken in approaching the problem of the United States-Russian relations. The first is that it is not possible to get along with the Russians and therefore war is inevitable. The second is that war with Russia would bring catastrophe to all mankind, and therefore we must find a way of living in peace. It is clear that our own welfare as well as that of the entire world requires that we maintain the latter point of view....

We should try to get an honest answer to the question of what the factors are which cause Russia to distrust us, in addition to the question of what factors lead us to distrust Russia. I am not sure that we have as a nation or an Administration found an adequate answer to either question, although we have recognized that both questions are of critical importance.

FACTORS IN AMERICAN DISTRUST OF RUSSIA

Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent months by the playing up of conflict in the press, stems from differences in political and economic organization. For the first time in our history defeatists among us have raised the fear of another system as a successful rival to democracy and free enterprise in other countries and perhaps even our own. I am convinced that we can meet that challenge as we have in the past by demonstrating that economic abundance can be achieved.
without sacrificing personal, political and religious liberties. We cannot meet it as Hitler tried to by an anti-Comintern alliance [that is, an alliance directed against the Soviet Union].

It is perhaps too easy to forget that despite the deep-seated differences in our cultures and intensive anti-Russian propaganda of some twenty-five years standing, the American people reversed their attitudes during the crisis of war. Today, under the pressure of seemingly insoluble international problems and continuing deadlocks, the tide of American public opinion is again turning against Russia. In this reaction lies one of the dangers to which this letter is addressed.

**FACTORS IN RUSSIAN DISTRUST OF THE WESTERN WORLD**

I should list the factors which make for Russian distrust of the United States and of the Western world as follows: The first is Russian history, which we must take into account because it is the setting in which Russians see all actions and policies of the rest of the world. Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest—by the Mongols, the Turks, the Swedes, the Germans and the Poles. The scant thirty years of the existence of the Soviet Government has in Russian eyes been a continuation of their historical struggle for national existence. The first four years of the new regime, from 1917 through 1921, were spent in resisting attempts at destruction by the Japanese, British and French, with some American assistance, and by the several White Russian armies [anti-communist forces in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1921] encouraged and financed by the Western powers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet State was almost conquered by the Germans after a period during which the Western European powers had apparently acquiesced in the rearming of Germany in the belief that the Nazis would seek to expand eastward rather than westward. The Russians, therefore, obviously see themselves as fighting for their existence in a hostile world.

Second, it follows that to the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the Western powers seem to have an aggressive intent. Our actions to expand our military security system...appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense. I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world, and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history....

Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm water ports and her own security system in the form of “friendly” neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case. After twenty-five years of isolation and after having achieved the status of a major power, Russia believes that she is entitled to recognition of her new status. Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by and large has never existed, seems to her an attempt to reestablish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her.

**WHAT WE SHOULD DO**

If this analysis is correct, and there is ample evidence to support it, the action to improve the situation is clearly indicated. The fundamental objective of such action should be to allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicion and distrust. We must recognize that the world has changed and that today there can be no “one world” unless the United States and Russia can find some way of living together....

We should ascertain from a fresh point of view what Russia believes to be essential to her own security as a prerequisite to the writing of the peace and to cooperation in the construction of a world order. We should be prepared to judge her requirements against the background of what we ourselves and the
British have insisted upon as essential to our respective security. We should be prepared, even at the expense of risking epithets of appeasement, to agree to reasonable Russian guarantees of security... We should be prepared to negotiate a treaty which will establish a definite sequence of events for the establishment of international control and development of atomic energy. This, I believe, is the most important single question, and the one on which the present trend is definitely toward deadlock rather than ultimate agreement.

We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda. Several religious doctrines, all claiming to be the only true gospel and salvation, have existed side by side with a reasonable degree of tolerance for centuries. This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments [that is, absolute monarchies, in which the king’s word was law].

We should not act as if we too felt that we were threatened in today’s world. We are by far the most powerful nation in the world, the only Allied nation which came out of the war without devastation and much stronger than before the war. Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical to other nations.

SUMMARY

This proposal admittedly calls for a shift in some of our thinking about international matters. It is imperative that we make this shift. We have little time to lose. Our postwar actions have not yet been adjusted to the lessons to be gained from experience of Allied cooperation during the war and the facts of the atomic age.

It is certainly desirable that, as far as possible, we achieve unity on the home front with respect to our international relations; but unity on the basis of building up conflict abroad would prove to be not only unsound but disastrous. I think there is some reason to fear that in our earnest efforts to achieve bi-partisan unity in this country we may have given way too much to isolationism [that is, retreat from world affairs] masquerading as tough realism in international affairs.

The real test lies in the achievement of international unity. It will be fruitless to continue to seek solutions for the many specific problems that face us in the making of the peace and in the establishment of an enduring international order without first achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. The task admittedly is not an easy one. There is no question, as the Secretary of State has indicated, that negotiations with the Russians are difficult because of cultural differences, their traditional isolationism, and their insistence on a visible quid pro quo [that is, they must receive something in return for everything that they offer] in all agreements. But the task is not an insuperable one if we take into account that to other nations our foreign policy consists not only of the principles that we advocate but of the actions we take. Fundamentally, this comes down to the point discussed earlier in this letter, that even our own security, in the sense that we have known it in the past, cannot be preserved by military means in a world armed with atomic weapons. The only type of security which can be maintained by our own military force is...a security against invasion after all our cities and perhaps 40 million of our city population have been destroyed by atomic weapons. That is the best that “security” on the basis of armaments has to offer us. It is not the kind of security that our people and the people of the other United Nations are striving for.
I think that progressive leadership along the lines suggested above would represent and best serve the interests of the large majority of our people, would reassert the forward looking position of the Democratic Party in international affairs, and, finally, would arrest the new trend towards isolationism and a disastrous atomic world war.
Activity #3: Why did Cooperation Break Down?

Directions: As you read the document that your group has been assigned (either Kennan’s “Long Telegram” or Wallace’s letter to Truman), answer the following questions:

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<tr>
<th>Question</th>
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<td>Why, according to the author, had relations deteriorated between the United States and the Soviet Union?</td>
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<td>Why, according to the author, did the Soviet Union distrust the United States?</td>
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<td>What was the author’s greatest fear regarding Soviet-American relations?</td>
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<td>What were the author’s recommendations for how U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union ought to be conducted?</td>
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